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ELIZABETH SEBRELL, Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES
RAILWAY CORPORATION (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Negligencc-lnstructions.-In an action for injuries sustained
by a motorist as the result of a collision of her automobile and
a streetcar, an instruction that the jury should not consider
the question of injuries or damages prior to determining the
issue of liability could reasonably be understood as requiring
the jury merely to separate in its deliberations the question of
injuries and damages from the question of liability, and did
not eonfliet with a further instruetion that a grievously injured
person losing her memory was entitled to the presumption
that she exercised reasonable eare, since the jury eould not
reasonably doubt from such instructions that it could eonsider plainti1f's injuries in determining whether she suffered
a loss of memory.
[2] Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions-Conficting Instructions.-Instruetions th.1t are eontradictory in essential elements may warrant the reversal of a judgment on the ground
that it cannot be ascertained whieh instruetion was followed
by the jury.
[3] ld.-Harmless Error-Instructions-Oon1ticting Instructions.
-In determining whether there is such a conflict in the ipstruetions that it cannot be ascertained which instruction
was followed by the jury, the decisive question is whether the
instruetions read as a whole and in the light of the cireumstanees of the ease in which they were given, are apt to con. fuse a person of ordinary intelligence.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. Frank
G. Swain, Judge. Judgment affirmed; appeal from order dismissed.
Action for damages for injuries sustained in a collision of
an automobile and a streetcar. Judgment for defendant
affirmed.
[31 See 2 Cal.Jur. 1027; 24 Cal.Jur. 820; 53 Am.Jur. 440.
licK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 180; {2, 3] Appeal
and Error, § 1641.
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Forrest .A. Betts for Appellant.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and Sherman Welpton, Jr., for
Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintifi appeals from a judgment entered
on a jury verdict for defendant in an action for damages for
injurie~ to person and property sustained in a collision between her automobile and a streetcar owned by defendant.
Plaintiff's automobile, proceeding south on New Hampshire
A venue in Los Angeles, and ,defendant's streetcar, proceeding
west on Sixth Street, collided at the intersection. A boulevard '
stop sign on the northwest corner of the intersection of the two
st.reets requires southbound vehicl~s on New Hampshire Avenue to stop before crossing Sixth Street. There are no stop
signs on Sixth Street requiring vehicles approaching New
Hampshire .Avenue to stop. Plaintiff testified that she made
the required stop and carefully looked to her right and left; ,
that t.he intersection is a blind intersection j that she did not '
see the streetcar or any" moving traffic" on Sbcth Street j and
that she remembers" nothing at all" from the time she brought
her automobile to a stop until after the collision, since injuries from the collision deprived her of any memory of the
events related to the accident. The strl!etcar operator testified
that he could not see north on New Hampshire Avenue until
he was within a distance of a few feet from the intersection;
that when he was 10 or 15 feet from the east curb line of New
Hampshire Avenue, he first saw plaintiff's automobile traveling at a speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour; that plaintiff crossed
the white line on New Hampshire Avenue, at which southbound vehicles were required to stop, and never applied the
brakes; that he applied the emergency brake as quickly as he
could j that the front of the streetcar collided with the door
of the automobile on the side where plaintiff was sitting; that
plaintiff did not vary her speed after he first saw her or "look
up" before the streetcar struck the automobile j that he rang
the bell intermittently while he was proceeding on Sixth
Street, and that" I am pretty sure I rang it as fast as I could
ring it when I seen danger." Other witnesses testified that
they heard the streetcar bell ringing before the accident
occurred. One of the streetcar passengers testified that as it
approached the scene of the accident the :.:t.rl!ctcar proceeded
at a spp.ed of approximately 20 miles per hour; that she first
saw plaintiff's automobile when it was approximately 10 feet
i
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north of the boulevard ..'top Rign; that it looked CClike it
v..ould come throu~h the stop sign and strike" her; that the
automobile did not fltop hefore entering the intersection;
thnt she f(>lt the strcetcar slow down a little when the brllk~s
wcrc applied.
[1] P1aintiff docs not contend that the verdict W:lS not
supported by the evidence. The sole issue on appeal is rnised
by her contention that the trial court committed prejudicial
error in instructing the jury. The jury was instructed: "I
instruct you that it would be a violation of your duty as jurors
to consider the question of injuries ordnml\~es, it any, prior
to determining the issue of liability or to allow the question
of injuries or uamages, if any, to affect jour judgment in any
W:l.Y in determining the issue of liability. The first question
for you to decide is whether or not thc plaintiff is entitled
to recover in this action lU'!'ainst the defendant. If you :find
from the evidl!nce that plaintiff is not entitled to recover, then
it is your duty to Dmllediatcly return the verdict in favor of
said clefl!Udant." The jury was also instructed: "It is the
tcstimony of plaintiff in this case that she does not recollect
DllY event related to the accident, and th:l.t her last recollection is that of ha,ing brought her automobile to a stop with
the front end. of it appro:x:i.mntely even with the boulevard
stop sign which is located at the northwest corller of the intersection. A person who h:t.S been RO grievously injured in an
accident as to be deprived of her memory io; entitled to the
presumption that she exercised reasonable care for her own
protection. • . ."
Plaintiff contends that the :first instruetion withhcld from
the jury the right to consider plaintiff's injuries in determining the issue of liability, and therefore conflicted with the
instruction that the jury consider whether as a result of her
injuries plaintiff had been deprived of hcr memory aud was
thus entitled to the presumption that she exercised reasonable
care for her o'vn protection. The latter instruction directl·d
the jury to considcrplainti1f's injuries in determining liability
for thl! question whether her injuries rcsu1ted in a 10Sli of
memory ('ntitlin:r hl!'r to the pr(l!;umption wa.c; a ruaterial iRSue
cOnel!rlrll1~ liability. Plnintiff contends that thl! conflict between th(' instructions Rubstantially nffectcd her right to the
presumption that she exercised reasollable eare for her own
protection. She rellcs on Simmons v. Lamb, 35 Cal.App.2d
109 [94 P.2d 814], in which the jury was instrucu.'<i "that
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it wouM be a violation of your duty as jurors to discuss the
nature and e:\.-tent of plaintiff's injuries, if any, until you
shall have first determined the question of whether or not the
defendant is liable. The question of liability should first be
determined by you before it would be proper for you in any
wise to discuss the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries, if any, because unless the defendant is liable, the
nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries, if any, shall not
enter into your deliberations." In that case it was important
for the determination of the issue of liability whether the
plaintiff or her allegedly intoxicated companion was driving
the plaintiff's automobile when it collided with the defendants'
truck. As to that question the defendants relied on the fact
that flesh, blood, and hair, which according to the nature of
the injuries of the plaintiff were likely to be hers, were found
on the broken windshield in front of the place where a passenger would be sitting. The District Court of Appeal held
that, although in some cases the instruction as given would
be proper, "[N] evertheless, in the circumstances here presented, it was prejudicial error to instruct the jury not to
consider the nature and extent of respondent's injuries until
they had determined the question of liability therefor. Before
the jury could decide whether respondent or appellants were
responsible for the collision, it was necessary to determine
whether respondent or her companion , . , was driving the
Chevrolet, and in order to do that, it was necessary for the
jurors to consider the nature and extent of respondent's injuries." (35 Cal.App.2d 113.)
In the present case the jury was not instructed as it was
in Simmons v. Lamb, supra, that the issue of liability sllould
first be determined "before it would be proper for you in
any wise to discuss the nature and extent of the plaintiff'"
injuries," or that "unless the defendant is liable, the nature
and extent of the plaintiff's injuries, if any, shall not enter
into your deliberations." The jury was instructed that they
should not" consider the question of injuries or damages, if
any, prior to determining the issue of liability, or to allow
the question of injuries or damages, if auy, to affect your
judgment in any way in determining the issue of liability,"
(Italics added.) This instruction in effect advised the jury
that they should not assume that defendant was negligent and
pass immediately to a discussion of the question of damages
and that they should not be swayed by sympathy or sentiment
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because of the injuries in determining the issue of liability.
The in~truction could reasonably be understood a~ requiring
the jury l)lerely to separate in its deliberations the question
of injuries and damages from the question of liability. Such
separation of the two distinct issues in the deliberations of
the jury could be observed even though the jury would have
to cousider plaintiff's injuries in determining whether she
suffered a loss of memory entitling her to the presumption.
If the two instructions are read together, it is clear the jury
could not reasonably doubt that it could consider plaintiff's
injuries in determining whether plaintiff suffered the loss of
memory on which her right to the presumption depended.
In the Simmons case the instruction withholding from the
jury consideration of plaintiff's injuries in determining the
issue of liability Rtood alone; it was not supplemented by an
instruction requiring the jury to consider the injuries sustained by plaintiff in determining whether the plaintiff or
her companion was driving the plaintiff's automobile when
the collision occurred. Thus, the jury was precluded from
considering the injuries of the plaintiff even for the purpose
of determining who was driving the plaintiff's automobile
at the time of the accident. In that case there was therefore
no problem as to conflicting instructions, whereas in the
present case the question is whether there is such a conflict
between the two instructions in question that the jury could
reasonably doubt that it was entitled to follow the instruction
requiring it to consider plaintiff's injuries in determining
whether she suffered a loss of memory.
[2] Instructions that are contradictory in essential elements may warrant the reversal of a judgment on the ground
that it cannot be ascertained which instruction was followed
by the jury. (Chidester v. Consolidated People's Ditch 00.,
53 Cal. 56, 58; Starr v. Los Angeles Ra~1way 00., 187 Cal. 270,
280 [201 P. 599]; Soda v. Marriot, 118 Cal.App. 635, 643
[5 P.2d 675].) [3] In determining whether there is such
a conflict the decisive question is whether the instructions
read as a whole and in the light of the circumstances of the
case in which they were given, are apt to confuse a person of
ordinary intelligence. It is common knowledge that instructions, like statutes, may include in addition to a general
rule a special rUle applicable only in particular circumstances
and that the special rule qualifiE'.s the general. (See, Civ.
Code, § 3534; Code Civ. Proc., § 1859; JJasset v. Nascimiento,
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108 Cal.App. 14, 19 [291 P. 269].) In the present case the
instruction relating to the presumption required the jury to
consider a particular consequence of plaintiff's injurie:s for
the purpose specified in the instruction. No explicit statement was necessary to make a person of ordinary intelligence
understand that a consideration of plaintiff's injuries in conformity with this instruction would not violate the general '
instruction that the jury determine the question of liability .
before it considered the question of injuries or damages.
The judgment is affirmed and the appeal from the order
denying a new trial is dismissed.

Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
GIBSON, C. J.-I concur in the judgment. Although in
my opinion the instructions could have more clearly stated
the principles of law involved, it does not appear that there
has been a miscarria.ge of justice in this case.
Shenk, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
By a process of finespun legalistic reasoning the majority
has arrived at the conclusion that there is no conflict in the
instructions which, in effect, tell the jury that it must or must
not consider certain evidence. No amount of verbiage, however artistically arranged, can erase this conflict. It is 80
apparent "that he may run that readeth it."
The majority opinion does not set forth the criticized instructions in the order in which they appear in the transcript.
It places the instructions in reverse order without comment
as to the order in which they were read to the jury or the
space of time which elapsed between the reading of the two
instructions. The record discloses that the instructions given
by the court to the jury covered 36 pages of the transcript.
They commence at page 201 and end on page 237. Plaintiff's
instruction No. 51 ·appears at page 205 and is as follows:
"It is the testimony of the plaintiff in this ca.'le that she does
not recollect any event related to the accident, and that her
last recollection is that of having brought her automobile
to a stop with the front end of it approximately even with
the boulevard stop sign, which is located at the northwest
corner of the intersection. A person who has been so griev-
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ously injured in an accident as to be depriv~d of her mcmory
is entitled to the presumption that she exercised reasonable
care for hcr OVIIl protection. This is a rebuttable presumption, but is one to which the plaintiff is entitled to have you
give cOn.<;ideration at all points in the ca.o:;e, fUld ev~n unto
the deliberation in the jury room." The instruction which
is said to conflict with the foregoing instruction is defendant's instruction No. XI and it appears in the trnru;cript at
page 231. It is as follows: "I instruct you that it would be
a violation of your duty as jurors to consider the question of
injuries or damages, if any, prior to determining the issue
of liability or to allow the question of injuries or damages,
if any, to affect your judgment in any way in determining
the issue of liability. The first question for you to decide is
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action against the defendant. If you find from the evidence
that plaintiff is not entitled to recover, then it is your duty
to immediately return a verdict in favor of said defendant."
So it appears from the record that after reading to the
jury plaintiff's instruction No. 51 above quoted, the court
read some 26 pages of other instructions befor~ coming to
defendant's instruction No. XI. After reading six more
pages of instructions, the case was submitted to the jury.
To those who have had experience in the trial of jury cases
the foregoing procedure is a matter of considerable significance. Even a trained legal mind cannot retain t1!e phraseology contained in plaintiff's instruction No. 51 while listening
to some 26 pages of other instructions and differentiate its
phraseology from that contained in defendant's instruction
No. XI. Even if the two instructions had been read in consecutive order, they would have been confusing and misleading. But when we consider the fact that defendant '8
instruction No. XI was read to the jury near the end of the
charge, and after 26 pages of other instructions had been read
sinee the reading of plaintiff's instruction No; 51, it presents
a picture, which anyone familiar with the modus operandi
of a jury trial would say, was very unfavorable to plaintiff's
case.
Without giving any consideration to the foregoing factual
situation, the majority opinion states: "The jury was instructed that they should not' consider the question of injurie,
or damages, if any, prior to determining the issue of liability
or to allow the question of injuries or damages, if any, to
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aft'cct your judgment in any way in dctermining the issue of
liability.' (Italics added.) This instruction in eft'ect advised
the jury that they should not assume that defendant was
negligent and pass immediately to a discussion of the question
of damages and that they should not be swayed by sympathy
or sentiment because of the injuries in determining the issue
of liability. The instruction could reasonably be understood
as requiring the jury merely to separate in its deliberations '
the question of injuries and damages from the question of
liability. Such separation of the two distinct issues in the
deUberations of the jury could be observed even though the
jury would have to consider plaintiff's injuries in determi-ning whether she suffered a loss of memory entitling her to
the presumption. If the two instructions are read together,
it is clear the jury could not reasonably doubt that it could
consider plaintiff's injuries in determining whether plaintiff
suffered the loss of memory on which her right to the presumption depended." [Emphasis added.] The absurdity
of the reasoning in the majority opinion stands out boldly
when it is observed that the author found it necessary to
emphasize the finespun distinction between the phrases
"question of injuries and damages" and "issue of liability."
One who has had experience in the trial forum knows that
the only opportunity the juror has to consider an instruction
is when he listens to it as it is read to the jury by the trial
judge. Even without such experience or unusual imagina- '
tive powers, ordinary common sense should dictate that the
reasoning in the above-quoted excerpt is so highly fallacious
and unsound that it amounts to an utter absurdity. Furthermore, the premise for such reasoning is false. There is not
the slightest intimation in the instruction in question to the
effect "that [the jury] should not be swayed by sympathy
or sentiment because of the injuries in determining the issue
of liability." This statement in the majority opinion is without foundation in fact and is indicative of the absurd lengths
to which the majority is willing to go in order to find support
for its unsound and illogical conclusion. The opinion then
states that: "The instruction could reasonably be understood
as requiring the jury merely to separate in its deUberations
the question of injuries and damages from the question of
liab~1ity."
[Emphasis added.] Anyone who has had ex. perience in the trial of jury cases knows that the suggested
requirement is far beyond the capacity of the average juror
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evcn in cases where the instructions are clear and explicit
and beyond the realm of conflict. From the discussion in
the majority opinion on this proposition it is obvious that
no consideration has been given to the practical aspects of a
jury trial. The majority opinion further states: "Such separation of the two distinct issues in the deliberations of the
jury could be observed even though the jury would have to
consider plaintiff's injuries in determining whether she
suffered a loss of memory entitling her to the presumption."
The majority opinion makes this statement notwithstanding
the clear, positive and explicit statement in the instruction
that: "1 instruct you that it would be a 'Violation of your duty
as jurors to consider the question of injuries or damages, if
any, prior to determining the issue of liability or to allow the
question of injuries or damages, if any, to affect your judgment in any way in determining the issue of Ziabt1ity." [Emphasis added.] I do not believe that it is possible on any
basis of reason or common sense to reconcile the portion of
the instruction just quoted with the last quoted statement
in the majority opinion. To say that the jury would not be
misled by such an instruction in a case of this character is,
in my opinion, altogether too much to expect of the average
juror. I believe, however, that the average juror is a person
of ordinary intelligence, and, in my opinion, a person of
ordinary intelligence would understand from these instructions that he should not consider the nature or extent of the
injuries suffered by plaintiff until he determined that defendant was liable for such injuries. In other words, he could not
consider the effect of plaintiff's injuries in determining
whether defendant was guilty of negligence which was the
proximate cause of the accident, or whether plaintiff. was
guilty of contributory negligence which proximately contributed thereto. Therefore, he could not consider plaintiff's
injuries as causing unconsciousness or lack of memory which
would entitle her to the presumption that she exercised ordinary care for her own protection until he had determined,
independent of the presumption, that defendant was guilty
of negligence and that plaintiff was not. Of course, this view
of the instructions would deprive plaintiff of the benefit of
the presumption that she exercised ordinary care.
It should be remembered that defendant's instruction No.
XI was read to the jury long after the reading of plaintiff's
instruction No. 51, and just before the case was submitted
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to the jury. By such procedure the last command of the trial
judge was that the jury must not "consider the question of
injuries or damages, if any, prior to determining the issue of
liability or to allow the question of injuries or damages, if
any, to a1Iect your judgment in any way in determining the
issue of liability." With this command in their ears as they
retired to deliberate, it is not probable that the members of
the jury gave any consideration to plaintiff's instruction No. i
51 which advised them that they could consider plaintiff's
injuries in determining whether she exercised reasonable care
for her own protection. Without giving pla~ntiff the benent .
of this presulllPtion, the jury may well have concluded that
she and not the defendant was guilty of the negligence which
was the proximate cause of the accident. All this the majority
has failed to consider. It contents itself with groundless,
theoretical assumptions which are wholly lacking in reality
or practical considerations in the technique of jury trials.
The appeal of this case was :6.rst heard and determined
by the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,
Division Three, and a decision was rendered therein reversing
the judgment upon the sole ground that the above-mentioned
instructions \vere so conflicting that they constituted prejudicial error. The opinion of the District Court of Appeal
was prepared by Mr. Justice Parker Wood and was concurred
in by Acting Presiding Justice Clement L. Shinn and Justice
pro tern. Clarence L. Kincaid. This opinion is so logical and
well reasoned that I am constrained to adopt the following
portion thereof, which discussed the problems here involved,
ns a part of this dissent:
I
"The court instructed the jury, at the request of defendant,
'that it would be a violation of your duty as jurors to eonsider the question of injuries or damages, if any, prior to
determining the issue of liability or to allow the question of
injuries or damages, if any, to affect your judgment in any
way in determining the issue of liability.' Prior to giving
that instruction, the coUrt had instructed the jury, at the
request of plaintiff, as follows: 'It. is the testimony of the
plaintiff in this case that she does not recollect any event
related to the accident, and that her last recollection is that
of having brought her automobile to a stop with the front
end of it approximately even with the boulevard stop sign,
¥ bich is located at the northwest corner of the intersection.
A person who has been so grievously injured in an accident
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as to be deprived of her memory is entitled to the presumption
t.hat she exercised reasonable care for her own protection.
That is a rebuttable presumption, but is one to which the plaintiff is entitled to have you give consideration at all poin~ in
the case and even unto the deliberation in the jury room.'
The evidence on behalf of plaintiff, under plaintiff's theory
of the case that she was entitled to such presumption, was
sufficient to justify the giving of the last-quoted instruction.
The effect of that instruction was that if the jury found that
plaintiff had been injured to the extent that she had been
deprived of her memory she was entitled to the presumption
that she exercised reasonable care. In other words, the jury
was directed that it should consider plaintiff's injuries in
order to determine whether the presumption should be applied
in plaintiff's behalf. Such a presumption is a form of evidence, and, if applicable herein, it would, of course, be evidence on the question of liability. It therefore appears that
the jury was instructed in effect to consider the injuries of
plaintiff in determining the question of liability. As shown
by the other instruction, first above quoted, the jury was instructed that it should not consider the question of plaintiff's
injuries in any way in determining the issue of liability,
Those two instructions were conflicting. According to plaintiff's theory of the case, namely, that by reason of her personal
injuries she did not remember what happened after she made
the boulevard stop, the question as to whether the facts were
such that she was entitled to the presumption that she exercised reasonable care for her· own protection was an important
and material issue concerning liability. The conflict in those
instructions pertained to a material matter, namely, 8.l5 to
whether the personal injuries of plaintiff should have been
considered by the jury in determining the question of liability.
It cannot be ascertained, of course, which instruction was
followed by the jury. The giving of those instructions was
prejudieiaUy erroneous.
"In the case of Simmons v. Lamb, 35 Cal.App.2d 109 [94
P .2d 814], it was held to be prejudicial error to give an instruction that 'it would be a violation of your duty as jurors
to discuss the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries, if any,
until you shall have first determined the question of whether
or not the defendant is liable.' In that case material questions
\vere: (1) whether the plaintiff or an alleged intoxicated person, who was also riding in the front seat, was driving plain-
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tiff's automobile when it collided with defendants' parked
truck, from which oil pipe extended about 8 feet beyond the
rear thereof, and (2) where the truck was standing at thc time
of the collision. As a result of the accident therein the plaintiff's throat was cut from ear to ear, and there was a large·
hole in the right side of tlle windshield, and a small hole in
the windshield in front of the driver's seat. Plaintiff therein
testified that she was driving the automobile, but defendants I
argued that she was not driving 'because her throat was cut,
and because after the accident, flesh, blood and hair were
found on the broken windshield' in front of th~ place where
a passenger would be sitting. There was other evidence therein
that three of plaintiff's left ribs were broken at a place where
the lower part of the steerinR wheel would touch her body
if she were driving the automobile, and she testified that she
was not cut by glass~her theory being that the oil pipe
pierced the windshield in front of the driver's seat and cut
her throat. There was also evidence that plaintiff's daughter,
who was riding in the rear seat, was thrown into the front
seat and received a cut in her scalp above the hairline; and
that there was blood on the shoulder of the highway. The court
said therein at page 114: 'It was therefore necessary for the
jury to consider all of this evidence with reference to respondent's injuries in order to determine whether or not she was
driving her car at the time of the collision.' It was also said
on that page: 'The instruction, as given, [referring to the
instruction that the jury should not consider plaintiff's injuries] . . . withdrew from the consideration of the jury
certain facts which they should have had before them when
they fixed the liability for the accident. ' In that case, as above
stated, plaintiff's injuries were material upon the questions
as to who was driving the automobile and where the truck
was standing, and those questions, of course, were material
in determining liability. In the present case, as above stated,
plaintiff's injuries were material upon the question as to
whether she suffered a loss of memory to the extent that she
would be entitled to the presumption ~hat she exercised reasonable care, which question, of course, was material in determining liability.
"Appellant [respondent] herein argues that the instruction
in Simmons v. Lamb, supra, is distinguishable from the instruction herein, that the instruction herein states that the
jurors should not consider 'the question of injuries or dam-
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ages' in determining liability, whereas the instruction in the
Simmons case states that they should not consider 'the nature
and extent of plaintiff's injuries. Appellant [relOpondent]
argucs further that the instruction given herein, that the
jurors should not consider the question of injuries or damages
in determining liability, 'is far different from instructing the
jury that they should not consider the injuries or damages in
determining liability,' and that under the instruction given
herein 'the jury would certainly be at liberty to give consideration to the injuries or damages in determining the
question of liability.' The difference in meaning between thc
expression 'the question of injuries,' and 'the nature and
extent of injuries,' is not significant.
"As to the matter of liability, the court instructed the jury,
'In determining how the accident happened ... you are entitled to take into consideration those physical facts as are
established by the evidence to have existed, insofar as they are
pertinent to the accident. Such matters as the measurement
of the highways . . . the surface thereof . . . the comparative sizes of the vehicles, the physical damage done to the
vehicles . . . the distances which the vehicles traveled or were
knocked as a result of the accident ... also, all of such other
physical facts as are established to your satisfaction, are matters which you may take into consideration in arriving at
what the facts were.' It therefore appears that the court instructed the jury specifically that in determining liability the
jury might consider the physical damage to property. Such
instruction is a further indication that the court withdrew
from the jury a consideration of plaintiff's personal injuries
in determining liability.
"The judgment is reversed. The appeal from the order
denying the motion for a new trial is dismissed."
For the foregoing reasons. 1 would reverse the judgment.

